Advocating for Youth Political Disengagement Serves Authoritarianism: A Response to Al-Ghwell

In her seminal work "The Twilight of Democracy," Anne Applebaum explores how intellectuals can become seduced by authoritarian ideas, gradually transforming into ideologues who provide the theoretical framework for democratic backsliding.

Hafed Al-Ghwell's recent article advocating for Tunisian youth to abandon political resistance in favor of "quiet resistance" presents a compelling case study of this phenomenon, as he offers a distinctly Leninist solution to youth political engagement: the subordination of civil society and majority voters to authoritarian control under the guise of pragmatism.

Al-Ghwell's proposition that "Tunisian youth must learn a very important lesson, and fast: Engaging the state cannot always be about direct confrontation" reveals more than mere tactical friendly advice—it represents a broader ideological framework that seeks to legitimize authoritarian consolidation through youth depoliticization. His comparison between Tunisia and Iraq as models of political engagement fundamentally misrepresents both countries' distinct trajectories and current realities.

The data speaks for itself: Iraq, presented by the columnist as a model of "successful" youth adaptation to authoritarianism, faces a 27.5% youth unemployment rate, with 36% of young people suffering from diagnosed depression and anxiety disorders, and a troubling 23% involvement rate in criminal activities among urban male youth aged 15-24. The suggestion that Tunisian youth should emulate this model of disengagement becomes particularly stark when considering recent events: young Iraqis are currently facing trial in Tunisian courts for attempting illegal Mediterranean crossings to Italy—hardly an endorsement of Al-Ghwell's proposed path of "strategic patience."

Tunisia's context demands particular attention. When 94% of youth reject participation in recent elections, this represents not political apathy but a clear statement against electoral processes conducted outside democratic and legal norms. President Saied's self proclaimed 90% victory rate, coupled with systematic restrictions on civil society and the criminalization of political expression through Executive Order 54, demonstrates why Al-Ghwell's advocacy for "quiet resistance" fundamentally misreads the situation.

The economic dimension cannot be divorced from this political reality. Saied's interventions—from attempts to control the Central Bank to imposing punitive taxation on SMEs and expropriation of private properties—represent political decisions with economic consequences, not mere policy choices. The resulting 0.4% GDP growth and 38% youth unemployment rate underscore why separating economic engagement from political action, as Al-Ghwell suggests, presents a false choice for Tunisian youth.

Interestingly, while Al-Ghwell writes in Saudi-based media advocating for youth political disengagement, young Arab leaders like Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman acknowledge that "Saudi youth don't have time to waste." This regional recognition of youth political imperative—evidenced by Saudi Arabia's 37-year-old crown prince, Qatar's 43-year-old emir, and the UAE's 39-year-old minister of AI—stands in stark contrast to Al-Ghwell's prescription for Tunisia (and Iraq!).

The author's framework echoes what Applebaum identifies as a classic authoritarian playbook: the transformation of civil society from a space of authentic political engagement into a controlled sphere of regime-sanctioned activities. His call for youth to focus on "the quieter, consistent hum of daily community work" rather than "fervent cries of protest" represents not pragmatic advice but another piece of the ideology of submission.

The Third Republic Party maintains its position that Tunisia's path forward requires more political engagement, not less. The solution to authoritarian overreach isn't retreat into carefully circumscribed "community initiatives" but the restoration of genuine democratic processes and the rule of law, including a presidential election reset. While we respect the unique journeys of all Arab nations, including Iraq's different trajectory, Tunisians refuse to normalize democratic backsliding through what amounts to political surrender dressed as strategy.

The domestic political reality clearly states that the majority does not approve of a U-turn on democracy in Tunisia. It is Saied and his minority regime that need to stop arm-wrestling the majority of the Tunisian People, and fast. When 94% of youth reject participation in dubious electoral processes, this does not represent a mandate for authoritarianism, but a clear public rejection of the political regime. The suggestion that Tunisians should accept democratic backsliding in the name of stability fundamentally misreads both history and current realities.

This isn't about choosing between stability and democracy—it's about recognizing that genuine stability in Tunisia requires legitimate democratic engagement and peaceful turnover of government leadership to reflect the will of the majority, the will of the People.

Al-Ghwell's prescription for youth political disengagement, however eloquently presented, ultimately serves to legitimize authoritarian consolidation at the expense of Tunisia's democratic future.

Olfa Hamdi is the Leader of Tunisia's Third Republic Party and the country's youngest presidential candidate. An engineer, capital projects’ auditor, and former CEO of Tunisair, she brings technical expertise and executive leadership to political reform. Her experience includes Tunisian military institution teaching and advocacy for constitutional capitalist democracy, economic freedom, and rule of law in Tunisia.